The Forgotten Civil War of Sudan Part 2

Who Supports Who.

RSF

: UAE, LNA, Chad, South Sudan, CAR, Ethiopia, Wagner

SAF

: Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Ukraine (not anymore) and Russia

UAE

One of the worst-kept secrets in geopolitics is the UAE’s extensive support for the RSF. The Emiratis have been funnelling drones, munitions, and cash to the militia through three key regional partners — the LNA in eastern and southern Libya, Chad, and South Sudan. The motivation is clear: the RSF controls several major gold mines, and the UAE is one of the world’s leading gold trading hubs. The RSF had also previously supported the UAE’s military operations in Yemen against the Houthis, strengthening their ties. According to analyst Clément Molin, Abu Dhabi significantly ramped up its assistance after the RSF lost control of Khartoum.

Milblogger @afriMEOSINT on X has been instrumental in tracking alleged UAE supplies to the RSF. These include kamikaze and reconnaissance drones, armoured vehicles, air defence systems, munitions, anti-tank missiles, and financial transfers. The list also extends to Colombian mercenaries, field hospitals based in South Sudan, and local recruitment networks among Baggara Arab tribes in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Chinese AA systems supplied by UAE according to @AfriMEOSINT on X

According to Somalian Human Rights Advocate and Activist, Deeqa, the UAE’s growing involvement in Sudan and other Red Sea nations stems from strategic and economic ambitions rather than ideology. Its goal is to secure long-term food and resource security by investing in large-scale agricultural projects, mineral extraction. With its oil reserves gradually declining, Abu Dhabi seeks to diversify its economic base and ensure access to critical supply chains. Emirati companies such as International Holding Company and Jenaan Investment already control more than 50,000 hectares of farmland in Sudan, while the Abu Hamed project covers an additional 162,000 hectares. We acknowledge the possible issue of reliability due to bias, but a different perspective is always worth mentioning.

RSF ammo crates are meant to be scraped of details, but not all aren’t. Here is one being documented by SAF forces.

Turkey

On the other side, Turkey has long been a close ally of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The two share ideological alignment through the Muslim Brotherhood and mutual ties with Qatar, underpinned by Ankara’s broader ambition for influence across Africa. Turkey also maintains strategic military assets, including its Black Sea base, which supports its regional projection. According to Clément Molin, Turkish aid has centred on drone warfare (delivering six to eight Bayraktar TB2s, roughly 600 munitions, and ground control stations) alongside unconfirmed shipments of small arms and other munitions. Another serious consideration is Erdogan’s persistent Neo-Ottoman rhetoric for his domestic base, this gives a domestic casus belli for regional expansion. However, this has triggered a new shift in regional dynamics as Iran and the Gulf States feel threatened by this rhetoric. Iran After restoring diplomatic ties in late 2023, Iran quickly became one of the Sudanese army’s most important foreign backers. Tehran supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones, precision munitions, and technical training that proved decisive in regaining territory around Khartoum. Satellite imagery and flight-tracking data revealed a series of Iranian cargo flights to Port Sudan, confirming a steady flow of drones and weapons. Beyond direct support, Iran’s involvement reflects a broader strategic aim—to secure influence on the both sides of the Red Sea with the Houthis and Sudan, whilst countering Gulf ambitions. Iran also seeks to limit Turkish expansion, as the old balance of power realism theory argues states will aim to limit other state actors becoming too powerful.

Russia / Ukraine

When it became clear that the SAF were not going to lose, Russia shifted its support from the RSF to the Sudanese army. Moscow had initially backed the RSF through Wagner, mainly to secure access to the gold mines discussed earlier. However, by early 2024, Russia surprised the geopolitical stage by abandoning the RSF and siding with the SAF. The reason? Ukrainian special operations forces, operating alongside the SAF, were allegedly targeting Russian personnel in Sudan. In response, Moscow offered significant military aid on the condition that Ukraine was expelled and an agreement was reached to establish a Russian naval base on Sudan’s coast.

The MENA Cold War

The Turkey–UAE rivalry traces back to the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, when old power structures in the Middle East began to unravel. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP, Turkey sought to position itself as the leading voice of a new regional order grounded in political Islam and popular legitimacy. Ankara backed movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, supported Islamist-aligned militias in Libya, and provided early assistance to opposition groups in Syria. This marked a decisive shift from its earlier “zero problems with neighbours” policy toward a more assertive, interventionist foreign posture.

For the UAE, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), Turkey’s rise represented both an ideological and strategic threat. Abu Dhabi viewed Erdoğan’s support for Islamist parties as a destabilising force that could inspire dissent within monarchies and weaken Gulf influence. In response, the UAE launched an aggressive campaign to counter Turkish influence, funding anti-Islamist governments and militias across the region. It played a central role in supporting Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup in Egypt in 2013, backed Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya against Turkish-supported Tripoli militias, and aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus to constrain Ankara’s energy ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

By the late 2010s, the rivalry had hardened into a geopolitical cold war — fought through ports, proxies, and economic leverage stretching from North Africa to the Horn of Africa. Despite intermittent diplomatic thawing, Turkey and the UAE remain locked in a contest over ideological legitimacy, maritime dominance, and regional leadership. Sources: News/Journal sources available upon request, not shown to maintain visual integrity of page. OSINT Accounts used: AfriMEOSINT on X, Clement_Molin on X, Suriyak on T, AMK_Mapping on T, Vista on T/X (Arabic)