The Battle of Kostyantynivka Is Over... Or Is It?

Clément Molin, an analyst we have cited since Basedment's early days and who openly holds a pro-Ukrainian perspective, recently published an extensive thread on X explaining why he believes the battle for Kostyantynivka is not yet over. A central pillar of Molin's argument is what he describes as Russia's greater reliance on the "flag-placing" tactic. Both sides, but particularly Russian forces, have at times sent individual soldiers or small reconnaissance groups deep behind the frontline to raise flags in villages or contested areas. These locations are often still considered grey zones rather than firmly controlled territory. According to Molin, these actions serve both propaganda purposes and internal military politics, allowing commanders to claim objectives have been achieved and receive recognition despite lacking consolidated control.

Molin also argues there is a significant asymmetry in the available evidence used by OSINT analysts. Russian channels frequently publish videos of soldiers raising flags but relatively few strike videos, whereas Ukrainian sources rarely release flag footage and instead publish substantially more strike footage. Based on his dataset, he has confirmed Russian presence at 146 locations compared with 94 for Ukraine. However, he stresses this should not be interpreted as evidence that Russia has more troops or exercises broader control, as around 70 of the Russian confirmations originate from flag videos. In his view, these figures reflect differences in what each side chooses to publish rather than the actual disposition of forces on the battlefield.

Overall, Clément Molin argues that describing Kostiantynivka as already captured is inaccurate and oversimplifies the current battlefield. In his assessment, the city remains actively contested, with Ukrainian forces still defending positions across multiple sectors, including parts of the southern edge. At the same time, Russian troops have infiltrated various neighbourhoods, but infiltration alone does not equate to full territorial control. Molin stresses that neither side exercises continuous control over the city, with combat often limited to isolated buildings, basements, strongpoints and small pockets of terrain rather than clearly defined frontlines. He believes this fragmented nature of urban warfare is better represented by a contested "grey zone" than by maps assigning the entire city to one side. Strategically, however, Molin considers Kostyantynivka unlikely to remain in Ukrainian hands indefinitely. He expects a gradual Russian advance and phased Ukrainian withdrawals, but argues the battle will continue for months before Russia can claim genuine, consolidated control of the city.

The main point of contention appears to be who is sending more "flag placers" rather than who actually controls the city. In my experience, AMK tends to take the more measured approach to assessing territorial control. He describes himself as pro-Ukrainian but anti-Zelensky, which has somewhat awkwardly placed him in what many perceive as the "pro-Russian" camp, despite not fitting neatly into either category. Suriyak is harder to classify. He is not necessarily pro-Russian, but he has sympathetic tendencies towards the Assad government, Iran and Iranian-backed groups. Molin, while an excellent OSINT analyst, has a clear pro-Ukrainian bias. All three perspectives should therefore be viewed with those biases in mind. My assessment is that Kostyantynivka has largely fallen to Russian forces, but this war has repeatedly shown that capture does not necessarily mean consolidation. Chasiv Yar is a good example. Although it officially fell to Russian forces, fighting has continued for more than a year. This is where Molin's comparison with Toretsk is particularly relevant as the same can be said for that city. The next two weeks will establish a clearer picture of who is correct based on where the majority of new fighting will take place. Sources Available upon request