Russia's Setbacks Continue To Grow On The Frontline

Conflict Tracker

Russia-Ukraine The primary objective of Russia’s war effort has been the capture of the remaining Donetsk region – yet here we are, five months into this year's offensive and Russian forces are at risk of having their 2025 gains lost if something doesn’t change.

Here is AMK’s summary of the recent events around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, I will provide the link to the full analysis below:

Ukrainian forces have reportedly made gains through counterattacks east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk over the past two weeks, although several areas remain contested. In the north, they regained Mykolaivka’s eastern approaches, recaptured most of the forest north of Rai-Oleksandrivka, and cleared Russian infiltrators from forests around Pyskunivka. Isolated Russian infiltrations continue near Mykolaivka. Russian forces recovered positions east of Rai-Oleksandrivka and expanded their presence inside the village, where fighting continues amid overlapping positions. Further southwest, Ukrainian troops re-established control over Zapovidne and advanced towards the Siverskyi Donets Canal, with attempts underway to cross towards Dibrova and Minkivka. To the south, Ukrainian forces reportedly recaptured Vasyutynske, re-entered Malynivka and Tykhonivka, and secured strongpoints near Novomarkove. Canal crossings established footholds around Minkivka, while forward infiltrators reportedly reached towards Nykyforivka after a roughly 12-kilometre penetration. Russian forces also made limited gains northwest of Markove and continued attacks near Fedorivka. Territorial control remains fluid across these sectors. Source

What we’re seeing is a failure of Russian consolidation due to a number of reasons that I will go into detail below. First, we have to bring up the manpower dilemma. 2024 and 2025 saw the abandonment of mechanised assaults, this saved a significant portion of Russia’s armour but at the bloody cost of thousands of soldiers. Tactics largely rested around small group infiltration in constant waves which proved to be successful in 2025, but has Russia lost its steam? With information suggesting Russia may implement a new wave of mobilization, this may be the case regardless that Putin has publicly denied such statements.

Information regarding possible mobilisation: Vladimir Putin has reportedly signed a decree increasing the authorised size of Russia’s armed forces by 15,500, according to a thread by ChrisO_wiki citing Russian commentary. The decree raises total staffing to 2,441,630, including 1,550,500 military personnel, with the remainder comprising civilian staff. This is the fifth increase within a year. Russian commentators characterise the expansion as “creeping mobilisation”: gradually enlarging the military’s personnel base without announcing another mobilisation campaign. However, authorised staffing figures represent available positions, rather than confirmation that those positions have been filled. The expansion also reportedly supports Russia’s military restructuring, including the re-establishment of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, new divisions, and military construction units. These requirements extend beyond troops deployed directly to Ukraine. While additional positions could accommodate further recruitment, the decree alone does not establish how many personnel will join, when vacancies will be filled, or where they will ultimately serve.

Russia’s gradual expansion of authorised military staffing, coupled with Ukrainian drone units prioritising infantry targets, may help explain difficulties consolidating gains in Donetsk Oblast. Additional positions do not automatically translate into trained soldiers reaching frontline units, while persistent drone attacks can disrupt movement, resupply and efforts to reinforce captured ground. Small Russian assault groups may penetrate Ukrainian positions but remain vulnerable before establishing defensive footholds. However, this is only one possible explanation: Ukrainian counterattacks, terrain, logistical constraints and the availability of reserves also influence outcomes. Local advances therefore do not necessarily indicate that Russian forces can securely hold contested territory.

Effects of Ukraine’s Mid-Range Strike Campaign

Ukraine’s continuing intermediate-range strike campaign could create cumulative disruption across Russia’s supply network, from occupied Luhansk to Mariupol and the highways connecting southern Ukraine with Crimea. Attacks on depots, fuel trucks, bridges and railway infrastructure can force supplies onto longer routes, reduce delivery reliability and consume additional vehicles and personnel.

The potential ripple effect reaches frontline units: delayed ammunition, fuel and replacements can weaken assault preparations and make captured positions harder to sustain. Repeated strikes may also force Russia to disperse storage and divert air defences. These are plausible cumulative effects, rather than proof that entire supply corridors are closed.

This video shows strikes happening 130km from the frontline.

Loss of Starlink

Now what has somewhat been pushed to the side is the Starlink situation. Russia’s loss of unauthorised Starlink access in February created a communications problem that replacing individual terminals cannot fully resolve. Reliable satellite internet supports command coordination, drone video feeds and rapid information sharing; degraded connectivity can slow decisions and complicate cooperation between assault units, drone operators and logistics teams. Russia has introduced alternatives, including Sprint-030 terminals using the Express and Yamal satellite networks. However, technical reporting identifies lower bandwidth, higher latency and heavier equipment, limiting their suitability for mobile operations and live drone control. Bureau 1440’s Rassvet constellation offers a potential longer-term replacement. Ukrainian intelligence reported brief Russian military use during summer, but that does not demonstrate continuous coverage or widespread availability. The defensible assessment is therefore that Russia has substitutes, but a comparable replacement across its forces remains unproven. Communications disadvantages may persist alongside other battlefield constraints, although their current scale and contribution to stalled offensives remain difficult to quantify.