NATO: "We Are F--ked", Wargames Expose Major Flaws In Army

Since 2022, thousands of Ukrainian servicemen have trained in Poland and other European countries. While the programs cover tactics, coordination, tactical medicine, and Western equipment such as Bradleys and Krab howitzers, many Ukrainian soldiers say the instruction often reflects pre-drone NATO doctrine shaped by Iraq and Afghanistan. Frontline veterans argue that modern combat in Ukraine is dominated by constant drone surveillance and strike capability, creating deep “kill zones” far behind the line. Scenarios involving armoured assaults, bridge crossings, and rapid evacuation under the “golden hour” standard often fail to reflect realities where vehicles are quickly detected and targeted, and evacuations can take many hours. Some units even brought their own Mavic drones and demonstrated how decisive UAVs are, surprising NATO instructors during exercises.

Training abroad remains valuable, especially for coordination, discipline, and operating Western systems, but there appears to be an institutional lag between battlefield reality and doctrinal adaptation.

An interesting case study of doctrine misaligned with operational reality is the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. The offensive leaned heavily on NATO manoeuvre concepts — which function optimally under conditions of air superiority, robust ISR, and effective suppression of enemy air defences. Ukraine did not possess those advantages. Without air dominance, NATO-style manoeuvre becomes significantly more costly and constrained. That does not make the doctrine wrong, it means the conditions required for its success were not present.

There is absolutely benefit in NATO training. But it is increasingly clear that NATO as an institution has struggled to fully internalise what drone-saturated warfare actually looks like. The recent mock-battle we described above reinforces that point.

Another thing I’ve mentioned before: Russian and Ukrainian troops will be extremely prized advisors in the troubling years ahead. They are a living fountain of knowledge when it comes to modern warfare. This is one reason reports suggest North Korea has sent thousands of personnel to gain operational exposure — not just for combat experience, but to study how contemporary war is fought. States will compete to bring Russian and Ukrainian advisors into their militaries, especially drone teams.

Lastly, we are several years into the largest conflict since WWII, and I am still seeing Challenger 2s without additional field adaptations, groupings of soldiers and vehicles operating casually in exercises — practices that would be punished immediately in Ukraine. Even in major drills, Western armour often lacks the improvised protective modifications that have become standard on the Ukrainian battlefield.

There is significant talk of investment in autonomous and drone systems — which is an obvious and positive step. But what about the micro-level tactical adaptation on the ground? The battlefield has changed. The question is whether institutions y

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