How The War With ISIS Al-Qaeda Is Reshaping The Sahel

Conflict Tracker

Africa Since the beginning of September, clashes of reportedly unprecedented scale have pitted Islamic State’s Sahel branch against al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM along the Mali–Burkina Faso border. Both organisations are fighting governments across the region. Yet, their war against each other could help determine how long those governments survive.

Journalist and jihadism specialist Wassim Nasr describes a major battle lasting 48 hours, with numerous deaths on both sides but neither gaining the upper hand. OSINT commentator Brant reports fierce fighting across Gourma, substantial reinforcements and alleged Islamic State territorial gains. Reports of hundreds of casualties remain unverified.

Brant also cites an Islamic State statement claiming more than 200 JNIM fighters were killed during September 1 fighting, including 30 prisoners subsequently executed. These are the organisation’s claims, not an independently established toll. Claims that JNIM commander Jaafar Dicko was killed are disputed, with other accounts suggesting he withdrew. Whether the numbers are accurate is not the important factor here, it’s the significantly larger than usual claims along with the clear eruption of conflict between both parties that we need to hone in on.

The wider implication is the pressure this places on JNIM’s campaign against Mali’s government. In his September 30 and October 10 assessments, researcher Paweł Wójcik argues that Islamic State is attacking its rival’s backline to obstruct an outcome it considers threatening: Mali falling under JNIM’s dominance.

This does not imply cooperation with Bamako. However, forcing JNIM to redirect fighters and resources could indirectly give the government breathing room. JNIM faces a dilemma: press its advantage against the state while leaving openings behind it, or slow its campaign to confront Islamic State.

Wójcik reports IS penetration into areas usually associated with JNIM in Timbuktu and Gao, while cautioning that movement does not establish territorial control. Nasr’s analysis explains the underlying competition: border routes, resources and recruitment pools. Shared enemies do not make these groups allies.

Russia’s support introduces another variable. Wójcik assesses that reinforced northern garrisons could enable further Malian–Russian offensives, threatening routes used by JNIM and separatist FLA forces. Yet, concentrating forces in the north could create opportunities for Islamic State around Ménaka and elsewhere.

The rivalry also reaches beyond Mali. Wójcik describes interconnected fronts across Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin and Nigeria, where insecurity and illicit markets can sustain armed groups.

Separately, warnings about renewed political fighting inside Mogadishu illustrate another danger: internal divisions compounding existing insurgencies. Somalia remains a distinct theatre, rather than an extension of the Sahel battlefield.

Rival jihadists weakening each other may offer governments temporary opportunities. But unless states restore lasting security, the result could be shifting armed dominance rather than stability, with civilians bearing the consequences.

Geopolitics

Sources available upon request